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ABSTRACT 
In the current global cyber warfare landscape, cyber attacks on infrastructure are 
a serious threat. Although network administrators use intrusion detection systems 
(IDSs) to detect threats and anomalies, they usually only offer post-attacks alerts. 
If we could predict malicious activities, we could allow network administrators or 
security enhancing software to take appropriate actions in advance of damage 
occurring. Incoming intrusion detection alerts can be considered as a sequence. 
We used Pytbull to simulate cyber attacks within a testbed network environment 
and collected Snort generated intrusion detection alerts. We tested four sets of 
alert-prediction programs with this data: Single-Scope Blending algorithm, a 
Simple Bayesian Mixture algorithm, a Multiple Simple Bayesian algorithm and a 
Variable Markov Model algorithm. The harmonic mean of the precision and recall 
(F-score) measured prediction accuracy. The Single-Scope Blending algorithm 
performed the best in these tests, especially in a multiple attacker environment.  
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In his statement that “cyber threat is one of the most serious economic 
and national security challenges we face as a nation,” President Obama stressed 
the importance of securing networks against cyber attacks (Council, n.d.). 
Network administrators employ intrusion-detection systems (IDSs) to detect 
malicious threats on their computer networks. The intrusion-detection system 
monitors and generates alerts for network traffic that are malicious or suspicious 
(Albin, 2011). However, if an attack is genuine, the system usually reports the 
attack only after it has happened since most attacks happen in seconds and 
most intrusion-detection systems are not linked to an intrusion prevention system 
that takes immediate action. Network administrators will then take steps to rectify 
any system malfunction caused by the event by inspecting the alerts later. It 
would reduce or even prevent damages if one could predict the attack and 
perform pre-emptive actions.  
The goal of the thesis was to provide data to compare the performance of 
several prediction algorithms that could infer alerts earlier. These algorithms 
have various degrees of success in predicting states, events and actions on an 
agent-based simulation system (Tan & Darken, 2012a, 2012b). Tan adapted the 
programs used in Tan and Darken (2012a, 2012b) to predict Snort alerts. We 
evaluate the prediction algorithms by running the programs provided by Tan to 
compare their prediction accuracy on the effects of different attack 
configurations. The research required a collection a representative set of 
intrusion-detection system alert logs as the dataset for processing by the 
prediction algorithms. Computer networks are constantly exposed to cyber 
attacks. This threat has been growing over the years in terms of attack frequency 
and damage level. According to Symantec (2011), there are more than 
286 million new threats in 2010. The U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness 
Team (US-CERT) reported a 40 percent increase in cyber attacks in 2010 on 
federal agencies, from 30,000 the previous year to 41,766 (Johnson, 2011). 
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Traditionally, damages arising from cyber attacks range from taking Internet 
services offline to classified company information leaks, loss of personnel 
information, credit card information theft, etc. The focus has shifted to attacks 
that can cause significant damage.  
Intrusion detection alerts can be expressed as a Relational Time Series 
(RTS). The intrusion-detection system generates alerts as malicious activities 
arrive in time sequence. According to Tan and Darken (2012a, 2012b), a RTS is 
a “sequence of relational percepts.” (Tan & Darken, 2012b). The intrusion 
detection alerts RTS is inherently unknown, noisy and constantly evolving. Hence 
an alerts RTS provides a good domain for evaluating the effectiveness of new 
prediction algorithms. 
Chapter II describes the background of prediction algorithms. We will 
discuss the background of the key components used for the thesis in Chapter III. 
Chapter IV presents the steps involved in the setup of the experiment, details of 
the software, hardware and individual component configurations. Chapter V 
provides the evaluation of the results and Chapter VI provides the conclusion and 
suggestions for future work.  
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II.  BACKGROUND ON ALERT PREDICTION 
Intrusion-detection systems generate alerts when attack activities have 
taken place. They allow network administrators to conduct remedial actions. 
However, intrusion-detection systems cannot predict attack activities. A proactive 
approach is to anticipate and conduct possible attacks to prevent damage. This 
chapter describes the current approaches to prediction algorithm that may be 
applicable to predicting intrusion detection alerts. 
One approach to predicting an attacker’s behavior is plan recognition. 
Geib and Goldman (2001) defined a plan library of specific attacks to predict an 
attack plan. Plan recognition entails having a security professional to compile the 
plan library manually. It is time consuming and not always able to respond to new 
attack variants. To account for variation in order or missing actions in an attack 
sequence, will increase the complexity of the plan matching. Also, the plan library 
must be updated frequently to meet new attack sequence.  
Other methods do data mining to predict the occurrence likelihood of the 
next alert. Cipriano, Zand, Houmansadr, Kruegel, and Vigna (2011) introduced 
such a prediction algorithm, Nexat, that automates machine learning process.  
During data mining, it uses historical data to learn the co-occurrence of the alerts. 
At run time, it uses the trained database and weighted probability to predict the 
next alert. A large database of historical data is required. Nexat finds a fit to the 
historical data and so cannot predict new attacks.  
Other work proposed proposed the use of “network attack graph” to 
analyze the security vulnerabilities and find all possible attack sequences (Lei & 
Li, 2007). A network attack graph is generated by correlating alerts according to 
source and destination Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. The predicted next alert 
is determined through predictability scores derived from the attack graph. It 
provides graphical flow of the attack sequence to the network administrator. 
However, the graph generation process includes low probable alerts into the 
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attack sequence, which must then be removed manually to improve the 
prediction. This method also cannot detect out of sequence attacks. 
Another technique called “sequence pattern mining” reduces the effort to 
construct pattern rules. Using the database derived from a historical attack 
sequence is vulnerable to new attack strategies. Li, Zhang, Li, and Wang (2007) 
observe that most attacks are completed within a certain time span. They 
proposed an incremental mining algorithm to identify sequential attack patterns 
over divided time window. The database is updated within a shorter period after 
the new attack strategy appears. After the initial rule generation, the performance 
of subsequent updates would be faster as the number of new alert sequence 
received reduces.  
Another way of processing security alerts is by organizing them into 
relational time series (RTS). The intrusion-detection system generates security 
alerts in a sequential order by time of arrival. These alerts form a sequence of 
relational percepts. “Each percept is a ground atom defined as pi = r(c1, c2, …, 
cm), where r is the predicate and cj(1..m) are constants that represent objects” 
(Tan & Darken, 2012b). For security alerts, r is the alert type/identity and cj(1..m) 
refers to an entity such as source or destination IP. We give an example of this 










Time Incoming Security Alerts Relational Time Series 
0 Alert message: (spp_frag3) 












30 Alert message: ICMP-INFO 


















Table 1.   Example of Network Security Alerts in Relational Time Series 
A software agent can learn percepts based on the situation (situation 
learning) and can predict future events in a RTS (Darken, 2005). When predicting 
the next percept, we can take into account all previous percept sequences to 
derive a probability distribution for a prediction. A simplifying assumption is that 
recent percepts are more useful than all the percepts. This is relevant to cyber-
attack activities where related attack events generally arrive within a short time 
span (“situation-based learning”). This also helps with noisy network traffic by 
reducing stray alerts from the predictor function. The situation learning approach 
organizes the RTS into smaller grouped situations. In addition to increased 
predictor relevancy (in terms of recent percepts), situation learning reduces the 




inferencing methods such as Variable Order Markov Models (VOMM), Multiple 
Simple Bayesian (MSB), Simple Bayesian Mixture (SBM) and Single-Scope 
Blending (SSB).  
Tan and Darken (2012a) compared the prediction performance of these 
methods in a role-playing game environment, where an agent moves and 
perform actions randomly together with other agents. In Multiple Siple Bayesian 
inference, there is a naïve Bayesian network for each predictive percept and 
situation pair. During each prediction event, the Bayesian network forms a 
probability distribution for all previously seen alerts by computing P(Ai|C), where 
P is the conditional probability, Ai refers to each alerts observed, C is the current 
situation. Simple Bayesian Mixture inference is implemented by normalizing a 
linear combination of multiple probability densities. Variable Order Markov 
Models use a variable order Markov chain instead of a fixed order.  
Single-Scope Blending inference is shown in Figure 1. A “generic space” 
contains the common atoms in both concept 1 and concept 2. Concept 2 is the 
current situation, and concept 1 is a previous situation that is selected to 
maximize the generic space. That is, concept 1 is the most similar situation. 
Blend B is the predicted situation which is generated by using the frame from 
concept 1 and constant mapping from concept 2. This is a form of inference by 
analogy. 
 
Figure 1.   Single-Scope Blending Network (From Tan & Darken, 2012b) 
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Single-Scope Blending could achieve better prediction performance than 
the other inference methods because it makes use of similarities for prediction 
instead of exact matching (Tan & Darken, 2012b). Since intrusion detection alerts 
form a RTS sequence, Single-Scope Blending would seem promising. Thus Tan 
adapted the programs used in Tan and Darken (2012a, 2012b) to predict Snort 
alerts. We tested these programs to evaluate their performance. A collection of 
intrusion-detection datasets was required. We generated these alerts within a 
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III. METHODOLOGY  
A. HONEYPOTS 
A collection of datasets (intrusion detection alerts) is required for the 
prediction-algorithms analysis. One way to gather the dataset is through 
honeypots, machines explicitly designated solely to learn the methods used by 
black-hats to probe and hack a system so that a network administrator can 
improve the security policies (Spitzner, 1999). Monitoring tools, such as an 
intrusion-detection system, are installed on the honeypot. If placed within the 
network, honeypots are used to monitor abnormal activities such as 
compromised systems within the organization. Our first experiments used such 
data. 
However, with honeypots we cannot control important factors that may 
affect prediction performance, such as frequency of attacks, number of attackers 
and number of targets. There is also noise traffic in honeypot data which makes 
analysis difficult. Collection of data sufficient for analysis through deployment of 
honeypots can be time consuming. Also, as vulnerabilities of the honeypot are 
learned, hackers may give up and go after easier targets, which decreases the 
alerts logged (Rowe, Custy, & Duong, 2007). 
Therefore, the thesis explored an alternative of simulating honeypot data. 
We controlled the environment to provide data on only specific types of attacks. 
This minimized “noise traffic” as the intrusion-detection system  was not directly 
exposed to the Internet. The testbed environment consisted of a local-area 
network, the intrusion-detection system and the attackers on other machine. The 
attacks were carried out in various configurations and we kept a log file of the 




B. INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM 
1.  Intrusion-Detection Techniques 
Intrusion-detection techniques are anomaly-based and/or signature-
based. Anomaly-based detection examines the operation profile of the network 
and determines what considers the normal activities. A deviation from the 
operation profile causes the intrusion-detection system to send an alarm for 
anomaly activities. Signature-based detection, also known as rule-based 
detection, uses information of historical malicious activities as signatures to 
determine the threats. In this thesis, we use Snort to generate the intrusion 
detection alerts.  
2.  SNORT 
Snort is an open source network intrusion prevention and detection 
system (IDS/IPS) developed by Sourcefire. Combining the benefits 
of signature, protocol, and anomaly-based inspection, Snort is the 
most widely deployed IDS/IPS technology worldwide. With millions 
of downloads and nearly 400,000 registered users, Snort has 
become the de facto standard for IPS. (Snort, 2012) 
We choose Snort because it is an open source product that is free to 
download and can be deployed cross-platform (Windows and Linux). It can be 
installed and run from a personal computer. The Sourcefire Vulnerability 
Research Team provides tested and certified rules free for registered users. The 
rules are updated regularly. A subscription is required for latest initial release. 
The rules are available to registered users after 30 days of initial release. Snort 
monitors the network and detects known threats using signatures and threat 
patterns.  
We briefly describe the Snort architecture (Figure 2) Snort consists of four 
main components (Olney, 2008): 
 Packet decoder. The key requirement of Snort is to capture network 
packets. Libpcap (for Linux) or Winpcap (for Windows) must be 
installed for packet capturing. The packet decoder translates it into 
packet-header information and payload.  
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 Preprocessors. The preprocessors rearrange or reassemble 
packets before the detection engine analyzes them. Incoming 
packets may be fragmented to avoid detection by the standard 
Snort rules, so preprocessors reassemble fragmented packets and 
generate pseudo packets to be fed back to the packet decoder. 
 Detection engine. The detection engine analyzes all packets with 
pre-defined rules. If a match is found, the packet is sent to the 
output module. The rule syntax can include various elements in a 
data packet such as protocol type, port number, packet length, 
packet header and packet content.  
 Outputs. After a threat is detected, the information is passed to the 
output module for presentation. An alert can be sent to the 
administrators by pop-up messages or email alerts. The alerts can 
be stored on a text file, csv (comma-separated values) file or on a 
Structured Query Language (SQL) database. Our research stored 
the generated alerts into csv files. 
 
Figure 2.   Snort Architecture (From Olney, 2008) 
We deployed Snort by connecting it to a port-mirroring switch. We 
configured the switch to send a copy of every network packet of other ports to the 
mirrored port. The test environment entails both attacker and target machines 
within the local-area network.  
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C. PYTBULL 
To create various attack configurations for prediction performance 
analysis, we use tools to simulate malicious traffic in an experimental network. A 
intrusion-prevention system penetration tester can do this. It injects malicious 
packets into the network either by means of custom packets with attack 
signatures or simulating attack patterns. We used Pytbull to do this and yield an 
alert file (Damaye, 2012).  
Pytbull can automatically conduct simulated attacks on a target. A Pytbull 
application consists of an attacker machine and a server. The prerequisite 
services running on the server are FTP, HTTP, SSH and the Pytbull server itself 
(running a reverse shell). These services allow Pytbull, executing from the 
attacker machine, to conduct tests related to these services. Pytbull provides 
about 300 tests in 11 testing modules, listed in Table 2. These modules are 
reconfigurable, which allow us to customize the attack patterns. 
 
No. Test Module Description 
1 badTraffic Non-RFC-compliant packets are sent to the server. 
2 bruteForce Tests the ability of the server to track brute force 
attacks (as on FTP). 
3 clientSideAttacks Uses a reverse shell to provide the server with 
instructions to download remote malicious files. 
4 denialOfservice Tests the ability of the intrusion-detection system to 
protect against denial-of-service attempts. 
5 evasionTechniques Check if the intrusion-detection system can detect 
various evasion methods. 
6 fragmentedPackets Sends various fragmented payloads to the server to 
test its ability to recompose them and detect attacks. 
7 ipReputation Tests the ability of the server to detect traffic from/to 
low reputation servers. 
8 normalUsage Sends payloads that correspond to normal usage. 
9 pcapReplay Repalys pcap files (packet sequences) 
10 shellCodes Sends various shellcodes to the server on port 21/tcp 
to test its ability to reject them. 
11 testRules Testing of basic rules. of the intrusion-detection 
system/intrusion prevention system. 
Table 2.   Pytbull Test Modules (From Damaye, 2012) 
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Each testing module allows tests that to be enabled or disabled via 
configuration files. Pytbull conducts these tests in sequence. At the end of each 
run, we extracted the alert log file to determine whether the tests are detected.  
Similar experiments were conducted in (Albin, 2011), which identified tests 
such as client-side attacks and pcap replay (pcap of the Slammer worm) that 
were not detected by Snort, although a large number of repetitive and not 
meaningful “reset outside window” alerts were found in our experiment. We 
excluded these tests from our random attacks run to reduce the number of “reset 
outside window” alerts. We broke down the individual attacks into separate 
configuration files so that we could select or randomly launch individual attacks.  
D. BACKTRACK LINUX 
We needed an operating system for both Snort and Pytbull. Snort can 
operate on either the Windows or Linux platform while Pytbull only operates on 
the Linux platform. We choose Linux as our operating system to simplify the 
software configuration so that we could install both applications on a single 
platform. We replicated the operating system and software configuration for 
multiple machines by using virtual machines. 
BackTrack is a Linux-based intrusion-detection system/intrusion-
prevention system penetration testing distribution that is free  (BackTrack, n.d.). It 
provides security professionals with a large database of security tools packaged 
in the Linux operating system. We use BackTrack release 2 with KDE desktop 
environment. BackTrack can be installed and boot from a thumbdrive, harddrive, 
or directly from a Live DVD. A Live DVD refers to the ability to boot the entire 
operating system and run applications directly from a DVD.  





BackTrack intrusion-detection system/intrusion-prevention 
system penetration testing modules 
Information gathering Stress testing 
Vulnerability assessment Forensics 
Exploitation tools Reporting tools 
Privilege escalation Services 
Maintaining access Miscellanous 
Reverse engineering  
RFID tools  
Table 3.   BackTrack Intrusion-detection System/Intrusion-prevention  
System Penetration Testing Modules 
Both Snort and Pytbull, and their prerequisite tools (such as Tcpdump and 
Libpcap) are pre-installed in BackTrack. Therefore, we do not have to go through 
an entire package installation process. Software updating and rules updating (for 
Snort) is advised to ensure the latest package release is installed. 
E. VIRTUALIZATION TECHNOLOGY 
Virtualization software, such as the VMware, seeks to improve machine 
versatility by allowing a single machine to run multiple operating systems at the 
same time (VMware, 2012). A virtualization application runs on the main 
operating system, sharing the system resources with other applications. Multiple 
operating systems then run on the virtualization application. The resources 
allocated to the virtualization application are shared among these virtual 
machines. For example, the main operating system can be a running Microsoft 
Windows 7 operating system, while the virtual machines are running Linux 
operating systems. Virtual machines are installed on “virtual disk” residing on a 
separate file container on either the main machine or separate storage system. 
This separation ensures the files belonging to different virtual machines and main 




In our experiments, we used the VMware player version 5 as the 
virtualization software. This enabled us to use two physical machines to run six 
virtual machines at the same time. Snort and Pytbull were configured on these 
virtual machines.  
F. EVALUATION CRITERIA 
This section describes the metrics used to evaluate the prediction 
algorithms. 
A true positive refers to making a correct positive prediction (the predicted 
event occurred) whereas a false positive refers to making a wrong positive 
prediction (the predicted event did not occur). A false negative refers to making a 
wrong negative prediction (the actual event coincides to the event that is 
predicted as not occurring). An intrusion detection alert prediction predicts the 
attacker IP address, the target IP address, the alert identification and the protocol 
type. These fields must match the real fields for the prediction to be considered a 
true positive prediction. 
The precision measures the number of true positives in relation to the total 
number of positive predictions (sum of true positives and false positives) made 
(Rijsbergen, 1979). In cyber security, a high precision level is equivalent to 
predicting existence of real threats correctly with low levels of false alarms.  
The recall measures the total number of true positive predictions in 
relation to the total number of actual positives (sum of true positives and false 
negatives). If the prediction in cyber security has a high recall value, we can say 
that the system focuses on security. That is to raise an alert for a possible threat 
than to miss a real threat.  
The F-score is the harmonic mean of precision and recall. It rewards 
increases in both precision and recall. We use this metric for our prediction 
algorithm evaluation as it balances between precision and recall instead of 
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IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP  
In our alert dataset generation, we identified three key agents - the 
attacker, the victim, and the intrusion-detection system. The attacker uses Pytbull 
to launch various penetration tests on the victim, whereas the intrusion-detection 
system listens to the traffic and generates alerts in a log file. This chapter 
describes the hardware and software configuration used in our experiment. 
A. EXPERIMENT SPECIFICATION 
1.  Hardware Specifications 
The specifications of each hardware component in our experiments are 
listed in Table 4.   
We deployed two physical machines in our networked environment. They 
were connected to the network switch via Ethernet cables. We use virtual 
machines on these computers to simulate multiple hosts on the network. The 
machine running the intrusion-detection system was connected to the mirrored 
port of the switch to listen to network traffic.  
A broadband router acts as a gateway to the Internet. Its main function is 
to lease IP addresses to the virtual machines by acting as a Dynamic Host 
Configuration Protocol Server and to direct incoming and outgoing traffic through 
Network Address Translation.  
Although our broadband router sufficiently connects the computers to form 
an internal network, it did not have a port mirroring feature to allow an intrusion-
detection system to listen. So we deployed a mirroring capable Ethernet switch. 
The machine running intrusion-detection system was connected to port 1, and 
the other machine was connected to port 2. We configured all traffic from port 2 






Processor Intel Core2 Duo P8600 2.4 GHz 
Storage 240 GB 
Memory 2 GB 
Network Interface Intel 82567LF Gigabit Network Connection 
Operating System Microsoft Windows XP Professional Service 
Pack 3 
Machine 2 
(Dell Latitude E6500) 
Processor Intel Core2 Duo P8600 2.4 GHz 
Storage 150 GB 
Memory 4 GB 
Network Interface Intel 8256LM Gigabit Network Connection 
Operating System Microsoft Windows 7 Service Pack 1 
Broadband Router 
(Cisco Linksys E4200) 




2.4 GHz, 5 Ghz 
Network Ports LAN: 4 x 10/100/1000 Mbps Ethernet 
Hi-Speed USB: 1 x 4 pin USB Type A 
WAN: 1 x 10/100/1000 Mbps Ethernet 
Number of Antennas 6 antennas. 3 each per 2.4GHz and 5GHz 
radio band. 
Ethernet Switch 
(Netgear ProSafe Plus 8-port Ethernet Switch GS108E) 
Standards 802.3i, 802.3u, 802.3z 
Network Ports LAN: 8 x 10/100/1000 Mbps Ethernet 
Features Network monitoring 
Table 4.   Hardware Specifications 
2. Software Specifications 
Initially, we configured Snort to run on the physical machine. However, we 
could not enable promiscuous mode for the network interface in Windows 
environment. Normally, a network interface only receives network packets 
designated to it; in promiscuous mode, the network interface accepts all network 
packets on the network. Thus, we ran Snort from within a Linux virtual machine,  
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which set the network interface in promiscuous mode during packet sniffing. We 
verified by checking that the Snort generated alert for attacks conducted on other 
virtual machines. 
We installed VMware player 4.0.4 on both computers. We created three 
different types of virtual machines. Each virtual machine used 512 MB of memory 
and 14 GB of hard disk space. The virtual-network adapter was bridged to the 
physical network adapter. We then installed the same software for these virtual 
machines. We created multiple virtual machines by replicating the physical folder 
of the initial installation in other folders. A total of six virtual machines were 
deployed in our experiment. 
The Linux-based penetration testing distribution, BackTrack 5 release 2, 
was installed as the operating system. The distribution uses KDE as the desktop 
environment and runs on a 32-bit CPU architecture. We opted for 32-bit instead 
of 64-bit because the physical machine used a 32-bit operating system. This also 
ensures portability across machines (or additional machines). To launch the 
desktop environment, we enter “startx” after the initial boot up sequence. 
BackTrack was pre-installed with Snort and Pytbull. We updated Snort to 
version 2.9.2.3 and its prerequisite package Libpcap to version 1.0.0-6. There 
was a need to update Libpcap so that it is compatible to Snort. We also obtained 
the updated Snort ruleset release 2.9.2.3 from the Sourcefire Vulnerability 
Research Team. We enabled the ruleset in the Snort configuration file. We did 
not need to configure a SQL database for the Snort alert as we are using the 
default csv file logging. 
We updated Pytbull to version 2.0. Prior to executing Pytbull or the Pytbull 
server, we must ensure Apache2, SSH and FTP services are already running as 
some of the attacks were conducted on these services. For both FTP tests and 
alert file retrieval, Pytbull requires the server to setup an FTP account and a user 
home directory. We also specify the paths of the supporting tools (nikto, hping3, 
ping, tcpreplay, ncrack, ab), which are necessary for Pytbull in the configuration 
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file. Pytbull launches specific tests according to the configuration file. The test 
configurations for each type of test were stored in module configuration file. 
Thus, we broke it down into individual tests by creating different module 
configuration files and Pytbull configuration files.  
The test selection is achieved by executing the associated module 
configuration file and Pytbull configuration file. A script was created to select the 
desired test (or choose one at random) and to create continuous test runs. At the 
end of each Pytbull execution, it retrieved the Snort alert file via FTP and hosted 
a webpage to produce a summary of the intrusion-detection system/intrusion-
prevention system penetration test. Since this feature was not required in our 
experiment, and to prevent the webpage hosting from halting our continuous test 
runs (running one test after another), we modified Pytbull codes to skip this 
feature. 
Table 5 shows the three key members of our experiment (the attacker, the 
victim and the intrusion-detection system) and the software components they are 













Intrusion Detection System (+ Victim) 




Snort 2.9.2.3 – intrusion-detection system 
Apache – web server 
SSH – secure shell server 
Vsftpd – ftp server 
Pytbull server – server to allow pytbull to 
conduct reverse shell commands 
Victim 
Primary role Solicit attacks. 
Software 
components 
Apache – web server 
SSH – secure shell server 
Vsftpd – ftp server 
Pytbull server – server to allow pytbull to 
conduct reverse shell commands 
Attacker 




Pytbull – launch penetration test on victim 
machines 
Table 5.   Software Components on Experiment Machines 
3. Network configuration 
We deployed the network participants as virtual machines in our 
networked environment. A total of three attacker and three victim virtual 
machines were deployed, where one of the victims  also had the intrusion-
detection system running. We divided the virtual machines between the two 
physical machines to balance the load. Machine 1 hosted the intrusion-detection 
system, Victim 1 and Victim 2. Machine 2 hosted Attacker 1, Attacker 2 and 
Attacker 3. We determined that the intrusion-detection system required higher 
processing power as it processes all packets sniffed across the network. We 
allocated it to the victim virtual machines in one physical machine as victim 
machines are the receiving ends of the attacksand this did not require high 
processing power.  
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Machine 1’s network interface card connected to the mirroring port on the 
first port of the Ethernet switch. Machine 2’s network interface card  connected to 
the second port. We connected the broadband router to port eight. All the virtual 
network interfaces (within the virtual machines) were bridged to the physical 
machine to simulate physical connections to the switch. We configured the switch 
to mirror all network packets from all other ports to port one. Figure 3 shows the 
network connections. 
 
Figure 3.   Network Connection Diagram 
4.  Problems Encountered 
 We initially deployed Snort in a Windows environment. The 
straightforward configuration is to put the Snort configuration directly on the 
physical machine. However, we realized that we need to determine whether it 
was working only after running the intrusion-detection system/intrusion-
prevention system penetration testing tool. 
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Intrusion-detection system/intrusion-prevention system testing could be 
conducted by manually launching attacks. However, that is time-consuming and 
requires specific individual configuration such as port scanning followed by 
sending a payload. Pytbull presents itself as an automatic tester packaged with 
different types of test modules. Manual updating and configuration for Pytbull are 
required although it was preinstalled in the BackTrack distribution. For instance, 
we created a relevant user account on the operating system for the FTP service. 
The configuration file was also updated to reflect the folder path of the 
prerequisite tools Pytbull depends on. Pytbull launched tests in a fixed order. 
However, we wanted it randomized. We discovered that the tests are based on 
the module configuration file. We segregated these attacks into individual 
configuration files. At each Pytbull execution, we selected the configuration file to 
use by random. 
After Pytbull was configured, we conduct some pilot runs. We discovered 
that Snort only detects network broadcast messages. Network traffic that was not 
directed to the Snort machine was not detected by Snort. Due to the limited 
resources, the participants were networked to the broadband router, which had a 
built-in switch. Online discussion sites revealed the possible reasons were either 
a lack of port mirroring switch, or the network interface’s inability to operate in 
promiscuous mode. The following steps were taken to tackle the problem: 
 Configured Linux-based Snort: We suspected that the physical 
machine’s network interface could not operate in promiscuous 
mode in Windows environment. Since Snort is pre-installed in 
BackTrack, we reconfigured Snort to run from Linux environment. 
 Snort Machine as victim: We conducted tests on the Snort machine 
to verify the configuration. We were unable to perform these tests 
on Windows-based Snort as the victim has to be running the Pytbull 
server in a Linux operating system. 
 Connect the machines to a port-mirroring switch: We procured a 
port-mirroring-capable switch and configured mirroring in place of 
the broadband router’s built-in switch. 
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 Tested Snort detection on victim: We started another virtual 
machine to test if Snort could detect Pytbull tests on other machine. 
We verified that this network configuration was working by checking 
the alerts for detected attacks on victim 1. 
 
B. EXPERIMENT SETUP 
In this section, we describe the different configurations we use to generate 
alert datasets.  
1. Experiment One 
We set up a scenario where there is one attacker targeting one victim. 
Between each attack execution, the attacker waits for a random period of up to 
180 seconds. This is to randomize the frequency of attacks. 
2. Experiment Two 
We  simulated a scenario where there are multiple attackers in the 
network. We increased the number of attackers to three and number of victims to 
three. The attackers launched their entire series of attacks one after another. But 
at any one time, there is only one attacker launching the attacks. Between each 
attack, the attacker waits for a random period of up to 180 seconds. Attackers 
randomly select the victims to attack. Because of this random selection, the 
number of attacker-to-victim pairs increases to nine pairs as compared to one 
pair in experiment one. 
3.  Experiment Three 
In our third experiment, we evaluated the performance on the algorithm’s 
prediction ability if the intrusion-detection system detects multiple attackers in 
randomized sequence. Three attackers were configured to launch attacks 
simultaneously. The wait period is a random period of up to 180 seconds. 
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4.  Experiment Four 
The last experiment evaluated whether the algorithm could perform 
prediction in situations where the attacks from different attackers overlap. Three 
attackers launch their attacks simultaneously with a wait period of about ten 
seconds.  
5. Problems Encountered 
We notice numerous “reset outside window” alerts were generated from 
Snort during our initial data collection. These alerts are repetitive and not 
meaningful. We are unable to explain the phenomenon other than by associating 
these alerts to the attacks that Snort is not able to detect and report. Snort is not 
able to detect client-side attacks and pcap replay (Albin, 2011). To reduce the 
number of “reset outside window” alerts, we disabled these Pytbull modules from 
launching during our experiment. Table 6 shows an example of a stream of “reset 
outside window” alerts Snort generats during client-side attacks. 
 







































129 15 1 Reset outside 
window 
TCP 192.168.1.137 192.168.1.101
Table 6.   Reset Outside Window Alerts 
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V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In this chapter, we present our results from running Tan’s prediction 
algorithm programs, adapted from Tan and Darken (2012a, 2012b), on our 
generated dataset. We compared the prediction algorithms at different entropy 
levels.  
Finally, we conducted significance testing to determine if the prediction 
accuracies of other algorithms were similar to that of the Single-Scope Blending 
algorithm. 
A. ONE ATTACKER VERSUS ONE VICTIM 
Figure 4 shows the accuracy of the prediction algorithm for one attacker 
and one victim. The dataset was divided into 126 batches of 100 percepts each. 
The F-score was used to evaluate the accuracy of the prediction algorithms. We 
post-processed and classified the prediction result of each batch based on 
different entropy levels. Entropy is a measure of uncertainty of random variables 
defined in Shannon (1984). In our context, the random variable is the occurrence 
of alerts. It is computed as 




E p x log p x  , 
where ( )ip x  is the probability of ix . Entropy in each batch of percepts was used 
to represent the number of unique alerts (consisting of the attacker IP address, 
the target IP address, the alert identification and the protocol type). It describes 
the variability of that batch with regards to the proportion of each unique alert. 
The entropy increases with the number of unique alerts. Entropy is an 
appropriate measure because when entropy is low (highly repetitive and low 
number of unique alerts), many probabilistic and statistical prediction techniques 
would work well. Conversely, these techniques are expected to fail when the 
number of new alerts is large. 
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Figure 4.   F-score Comparison: One Attacker versus One Victim with  
Random Period of up to 180 Seconds between Attacks 
The accuracy of Single-Scope Blending (SSB) and Variable-Order Markov 
Models (VOMM) were similar across the entropy levels while Simple Bayesian 
Mixture and Multiple Simple Bayesian showed worse declining F-scores. We 
observed that F-score decreased as entropy increased. This was consistent with 
the unpredictability levels. However, there was a decrease in F-score at entropy 
level three for all algorithms, which had only two batches of percepts (Table 7)  
All four algorithms performed badly for one of the two batches, causing a sudden 
decrease in F-score . 
 
 Entropy Level 
 1≤E<2 2≤E<3 3≤E<4 4≤E<5 
Number of 
batches 13 18 2 6 
Table 7.   Breakdown of Percept Batches: One Attacker versus One Victim  


















1 Attacker vs 1 Victim - Random 180 Seconds Wait 
between Attacks
SBM SSB MSB VOMM
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B. THREE ATTACKERS VERSUS THREE VICTIMS 
We wanted to compare prediction accuracy in scenarios where with more 
attackers and victims. We let three attackers randomly select one of three victims 
during each attack. This increased the possible actor pairs (attacker-victim) to 
nine to better simulate real-life cyber threats with multiple hackers scouring for 
potential victims on the network. 
We observed no difference in the types of random attacks launched 
between a the first scenario and a three attackers versus three victims scenario. 
Figure 5 shows that SSB performed consistently better than the rest as we 
increased the number of attackers and victims in our experiment. At entropy level 
five, SSB is 0.1 better in F-score than MSB and VOMM. SBM, on the other hand, 
dd not show any change in accuracy.  
 
 
Figure 5.   F-score Comparison: Three Attackers versus Three Victims with  
Random Period of up to 180 Seconds between Attacks  


















3 Attackers vs 3 Victims - Random 180 Seconds 
Wait between Attacks. No overlapping attacks
SBM SSB MSB VOMM
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At lower entropy levels, we already observed different accuracies among 
the prediction algorithms unlike in the first scenario. The reason appears to be 
that SSB uses structural similarities to better match seemingly dissimilar 
situations. SBM, MSB and VOMM received incoming percepts as nine different 
actor pairs. Assuming there was already a set of situations in the knowledge 
base involving attacker-victim pair A-B performing action set X, as SSB received 
incoming percepts involving a different attacker-victim pair C-D but performing 
same action set X, it could cast an analogy from A-B to C-D to make a prediction 
(Tan & Darken, 2012b). SBM, MSB and VOMM cannot form this analogy, 
because they can only predict alerts that have been generated before.  
Figure 6 shows the results where we allowed three attackers to launch 
their attacks consecutively. We expected the prediction complexity to increase 
because of the increased probability of overlapping attacks from different 
attackers, but a 180 seconds wait between attacks was too large to show a new 
effect. 
 
Figure 6.   F-score Comparison: Three Attackers versus Three Victims with  



















3 Attackers vs 3 Victims - Random 180 Seconds 
Wait between Attacks. Simultaneous Attacks
SBM SSB MSB VOMM
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Table 8 shows the number of alert batches distributed over the different 
entropy level. We reduced the random wait time between attacks to about 10 
seconds. At the same time, the number of incoming percept sequences 
increased within a short time period. Table 9 shows an extract of alerts from 
attackers of different IP addresses. It was observed that other attackers launched 
attacks while IP address “192.168.1.115” sent fragmented packets to IP address 
“192.168.1.101. Other than SBM whose accuracy remained similar to previous 
attack configurations, all other prediction algorithms showed declined accuracy at 
entropy level five. SSB remained the top performer by at least 0.08 as shown in 
Figure 7. 
 
  Entropy Level




Experiment 2 32 30 33 26 3 
Experiment 3 75 101 57 46 11 
Experiment 4 100 140 75 65 15 





Timestamp Sig. ID Rev. Message Protocol Source IP Destination IP 
07/27/12-
08:55:01.345651  
123 13 1 (spp_frag3) Tiny 
fragment 
TCP 192.168.1.115 192.168.1.101 
07/27/12-
08:55:01.345844  
123 13 1 (spp_frag3) Tiny 
fragment 
TCP 192.168.1.115 192.168.1.101 
07/27/12-
08:55:03.695396  
1 17322 1 SHELLCODE x86 
OS agnostic fnstenv 
geteip dword xor 
decoder 
TCP 192.168.1.138 192.168.1.102 
07/27/12-
08:55:03.695396  
1 1378 21 FTP wu-ftp bad file 
completion attempt 
TCP 192.168.1.138 192.168.1.102 
07/27/12-
08:55:03.695396  
125 2 1 (ftp_telnet) Invalid 
FTP Command 
TCP 192.168.1.138 192.168.1.102 
07/27/12-
08:55:03.766376  
1 2000001 0 FTP brute force 
failed login unicode 
attempt 
TCP 192.168.1.117 192.168.1.101 
07/27/12-
08:55:04.009447  
1 1122 10 WEB-MISC 
/etc/passwd 
TCP 192.168.1.117 192.168.1.101 
07/27/12-
08:55:04.323224  
123 13 1 (spp_frag3) Tiny 
fragment 
TCP 192.168.1.115 192.168.1.101 
07/27/12-
08:55:04.323327  
123 13 1 (spp_frag3) Tiny 
fragment 
TCP 192.168.1.115 192.168.1.101 
 




Figure 7.   F-score Comparison: Three Attackers versus Three Victims with Random 
Period of about 10 Seconds between Attacks. (Simultaneous Attacks) 
Although SSB outperforms the other prediction algorithms, it was the 
slowest. The computation data is tabulated in Table 10. The maximum prediction 
time for SSB was 4.283 seconds as compared to the MSB (next best performer) 
at 0.141 seconds, while the mean prediction time was 0.221 seconds for SSB  
compared to 0.011 seconds for MSB.   
 
Time (seconds) 
SBM SSB MSB VOMM 
Maximum 1.182 4.283 0.141 0.065 
Mean 0.038913 0.220718 0.010814 0.017035 
Table 10.   Computation Time: Three Attackers versus Three Victims with Random 
Period of about 10 Seconds between Attacks. (Simultaneous Attacks) 
Tables 11, 12, and 13 provides the probability the prediction accuracies of 
other algorithms were similar to that of SSB. Paired T-Test compares F-scores of 


















3 Attackers vs 3 Victims - About 10 Seconds Wait 
between Attacks. Simultaneous Attacks
SBM SSB MSB VOMM
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support the hypothesis (at  95% confidence level) that SSB outperforms SBM, 
MSB, and VOMM from a different perspective. 
1≤E<2 
SBM MSB VOMM 
Paired T-test 5.77E-04 1.36E-02 6.54E-19 
Group T-test 5.68E-03 3.51E-02 7.20E-20 
2≤E<3 
SBM MSB VOMM 
Paired T-test 1.25E-08 6.00E-04 2.49E-05 
Group T-test 4.12E-05 3.02E-02 3.05E-02 
3≤E<4 
SBM MSB VOMM 
Paired T-test 5.35E-10 1.80E-03 1.42E-07 
Group T-test 4.12E-08 1.71E-02 1.55E-03 
4≤E<5 
SBM MSB VOMM 
Paired T-test 7.33E-11 4.97E-07 4.68E-05 
Group T-test 1.40E-15 1.45E-03 2.14E-02 
5≤E<6 
SBM MSB VOMM 
Paired T-test 6.45E-06 1.34E-02 2.65E-03 
Group T-test 1.30E-07 3.23E-02 1.19E-02 
Table 11.   T-test Probabilities that the Algorithm’s Performance is similar  
to that of SSB’s (Experiment 2)  
1≤E<2 
SBM MSB VOMM 
Paired T-test 8.65E-15 3.55E-09 9.53E-15 
Group T-test 1.59E-06 1.75E-03 1.31E-05 
2≤E<3 
SBM MSB VOMM 
Paired T-test 1.71E-12 8.07E-05 2.98E-09 
Group T-test 1.23E-05 3.63E-02 1.48E-03 
3≤E<4 
SBM MSB VOMM 
Paired T-test 1.49E-29 6.06E-15 2.80E-21 
Group T-test 1.37E-19 1.35E-05 1.17E-08 
4≤E<5 
SBM MSB VOMM 
Paired T-test 2.39E-15 2.56E-13 1.73E-10 
Group T-test 1.18E-22 4.47E-04 6.64E-03 
5≤E<6 
SBM MSB VOMM 
Paired T-test 3.18E-07 6.49E-06 7.88E-06 
Group T-test 3.30E-11 1.15E-02 9.95E-03 
Table 12.   T-test Probabilities that the Algorithm’s Performance is similar  










SBM MSB VOMM 
Paired T-test 8.34E-24 1.34E-14 1.20E-14 
Group T-test 5.17E-04 1.77E-02 2.92E-03 
2≤E<3 
SBM MSB VOMM 
Paired T-test 8.71E-20 9.12E-06 1.37E-14 
Group T-test 1.05E-08 1.50E-02 1.46E-05 
3≤E<4 
SBM MSB VOMM 
Paired T-test 5.56E-28 5.56E-28 6.77E-11 
Group T-test 1.75E-17 1.75E-17 9.24E-05 
4≤E<5 
SBM MSB VOMM 
Paired T-test 4.02E-18 4.02E-18 5.89E-16 
Group T-test 3.58E-25 3.58E-25 9.91E-04 
5≤E<6 
SBM MSB VOMM 
Paired T-test 5.22E-07 5.22E-07 1.74E-04 
Group T-test 3.91E-08 3.91E-08 4.26E-02 
Table 13.   T-test Probabilities that the Algorithm’s Performance is similar  
to that of SSB’s (Experiment 4) 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This thesis generated intrusion-detection system alerts to support the 
performance analysis of prediction algorithms in cyber security. We generated 
intrusion alerts by simulating attacks within an internal network environment. This 
provided a sufficient dataset for the evaluation of a prediction algorithm, although 
some Pytbull modules are not detected by Snort. This approach saves effort 
because it would be time-consuming to collect intrusion alerts from real attacks 
through honeypots. We were able to adjust the frequency of attacks, number of 
attackers and number of targets to help us in our evaluation. 
We then evaluated the performance of several relational time-series 
prediction algorithms on our generated alerts. The prediction accuracy declined 
as the entropy level of the alerts increased. We observed that an increase in 
number of attackers and victims lowered accuracy of prediction, except of SBM, 
which underperformed consistently. The performance of MSB and VOMM were 
similar across the experiments, and inferior to that of Single-Scope Blending. It 
appeared that the latter’s conceptual blending approach was able to make good 
use of the structural properties during situation selection. It could help with 
situations where attackers vary IP address and targets.  
For future work, we suggest implementing online prediction algorithms into 
an intrusion-detection system. We could set up a common database to allow the 
system to store new alerts while prediction algorithms retrieve and process them. 
The predicted alerts can be stored in a prediction database to provide network 
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